DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Family violence is against the law in Canada. Although the Criminal Code does not refer to any specific "family violence offence," an abuser can be charged with an applicable offence. Criminal charges could include:

  • sexual offences against children and youth (ss. 151, 152, 153, 155 and 170-172)
  • trespassing at night (s. 177)
  • child pornography (s. 163.1)
  • failure to provide necessaries of life and abandoning child (ss. 215 and 218)
  • criminal negligence (including negligence causing bodily harm and death) (ss. 219-221)
  • homicide - murder, attempted murder, infanticide and manslaughter (ss. 229-231 and 235)
  • criminal harassment (sometimes called "stalking") (s. 264)
  • uttering threats (s. 264.1)
  • assault (causing bodily harm, with a weapon and aggravated assault) (ss. 265-268)
  • sexual assault (causing bodily harm, with a weapon & aggravated sexual assault) (ss. 271-273)
  • kidnapping & forcible confinement (ss. 279 and 279.1)
  • abduction of a young person (ss. 280-283)
  • making indecent & harassing phone calls (s. 372)
  • mischief (s. 430)
  • intimidation (s. 423)
  • breach of a court order, recognizance (peace bond), & probation order (ss.145(3), 127, 811, and 733.1)

These offenses are clearly inadequate to deal with most cases of domestic spousal abuse.

 

Legislative Reforms

In recent years, several changes have been made to the Criminal Code to improve the ability of the criminal justice laws to address family violence, such as the adoption of the criminal harassment offense, the protection of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process -measures were put in place to prevent victims from being re-victimized by the system, e.g., bail decisions must take the safety of victims into account, and publication bans are now permitted to protect the identity of any victim or witness-, the requirement for courts to take into account the abuse of a spouse or a child as an aggravating factor in sentencing an offender for an offence.

Again, these reforms are insufficient and most of them do not specifically address the problems of domestic abuse.

 

NO DROP POLICIES

 

Charging and prosecution (“no-drop”) policies were introduced in Canada in the early 1980s, beginning with federal guidelines issued to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and federal and territorial Crown prosecution offices in 1983. By 1985, some form of spousal assault policy was in place in most of the provinces of Canada. The policies were implemented in response to what was perceived to be an inadequate criminal justice system response to incidents of spousal violence. The policies were designed to counter the notion that spousal violence is a private affair, and instead give it recognition as a serious social problem, which is also a violation of the law. Police intervention and Crown prosecution of spousal abuse incidents were seen as critical elements of an overall societal response to the problem. The implementation of the policies was also seen as an important step towards protecting individual victims. By placing the onus for laying charges on the police and Crown, the victim could indicate to her abusive partner that the

decision to proceed was not hers, and thereby reduce the potential for violent recriminations. The ultimate goal of the policies was to achieve a reduction in the incidence of spousal violence in Canada.

 

The prevalence of such policies as a governmental response to the problem of spousal abuse warrants a close analysis of their effectiveness in achieving their stated goal reducing the incidence of spousal abuse in Canada.

 

An analysis of the research literature reveals that the effectiveness of charging and prosecution policies in reducing domestic violence is the subject of considerable debate among social science researchers and academics. Much has been written about perceived deficiencies in the policies and the ways in which they are implemented, including the oft- made criticism that the policies serve to “re-victimize” the survivor of a spousal abuse incident. The policies remove the onus from the victim to lay charges against her abuser, thereby reducing the risk that the victim will be blamed by the abuser for the abuser’s prosecution. As a consequence, however, many victims feel disempowered by a legal process that deprives them of any say in the ultimate disposition of charges and which often operates against their wishes to withdraw from the system. It is somewhat ironic that charging and prosecution policies were in part implemented as a response to the perceived need for criminal justice professionals to treat domestic violence “like any other crime”. The deficiencies identified in these policies are frequently rooted in their failure to recognize that spousal assault is not a crime like others. Unlike violence between strangers, domestic violence victims may live with their assailants, often have strong emotional and financial bonds, often share children, and often do not wish the relationship to end. All of these factors create complications for victims, police officers and prosecutors that are seldom present in cases of violence between strangers (Martin & Mosher, 1999; Johnson, 1996; Ursel & Brickey, 1996). Research that evaluates how these participants in the criminal justice process view the effectiveness of “zero tolerance” policies is synthesized herein.

 

Studies directed at assessing the success of such policies in reducing the incidence of spousal abuse have produced mixed results, as have those studies attempting to gauge the

reactions of women, police, and Crown prosecutors to the implementation of the policies.

Moreover, some prominent feminist academics have called for the abolition of the charging and “no drop” prosecution policies currently in place throughout Canada. Canadian jurisprudence on the subject of mandatory charging, meanwhile, has been sparse. While policies of mandatory charging and prosecution tend to bring more domestic violence cases before the courts, the central purpose of the judicial inquiry is to determine whether an offence has been committed, and not to assess the wisdom of the policy that brought the case before the courts. The existence of the policy itself is collateral to the determination to be made before the courts, that is, whether the guilt of the accused of the offence charged has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.