Broken Windows.
The theory of broken windows, first articulated by Wilson and Kelling (1982) and developed further by Kelling and Coles (1996; Kelling 1998), is behind many community justice approaches. The broken windows theory assumes that minor disorder, if not taken seriously and attacked, will increase fear of crime, decrease informal social control, and increase crime. Social incivilities (public urination and drunkenness, drug use, prostitution, loitering teens, and panhandling) and physical incivilities (vacant buildings, empty lots, junk and trash, graffiti, and abandoned cars) contribute to the deterioration of communities. There are variants of the disorder or incivilities thesis, but broken windows especially has influenced policies of community policing (see Taylor 1999b).
There is evidence that high levels of disorder are related with high levels of
crime. Kelling and Coles (1996) refer to Skogan's (1990) work as a proof of the broken
windows theory, since his study of decline and disorder in
American neighborhoods showed a relationship among disorder, crime, and
deterioration, the consequence of which is a downward spiral of neighborhood
decay. However, some have questioned Skogan's study
and suggest that his data do not support the findings (e.g., Harcourt 1998) or
refer to other studies that do not show links between incivilities and crime
(e.g., Greene and Taylor 1988). Others have pointed out that the broken windows theory badly
confuses means and ends when community disorder is identified both as the
social cause and the effect of crime (e.g., Crawford 1998), not to mention the
potential for abuse of power and racial discrimination in implementations
(e.g., Livingston 1997).
Skogan's study (1990) can at best support half of the
broken windows theory--the
downward spiral of neighborhood decline. Nothing suggests that targeting
low-level, quality-of-life crimes by police, prosecutors, and courts is the
only, the most appropriate, or the best way to stop a downward cycle or produce
an upward spiral to neighborhood revitalization. As Skogan himself acknowledged, "One of the 'iron laws'
of policy evaluation is that, the more we know about a program, the less
confidence we have in it" (Skogan 1990, p. 18).
He was also concerned about the consequences of order maintenance policing:
constitutionality dangers in street sweeps and roadblocks, virtually unchecked
discretion of patrol officers, and abrasive effects on residents of poor,
minority neighborhoods.
Recently, there is more reason to doubt whether the main premise--disorder
increases fear, crime, and deterioration--is correct after all. Taylor (1999a)
reports on a study that followed conditions in thirty neighborhoods in
Baltimore in 1981, 1982, and 1994. By 1994, physical conditions had worsened
significantly, yet there were few changes between 1981 and 1994 in citizens'
fear of crime or perception of disorder, amount of crime, or neighborhood
decline. Although the research teams expected something else, residents did not
report more incivilities, they were no more fearful, increased disorder did not
alter or increase crime, and neighborhoods did not experience structural
decline (Taylor 1999b). The study warned against community policing and
prosecution efforts that concentrate heavily on zero-tolerance
policies or fixing physical problems--the premise of these
methods has been exaggerated, they have been overused, and they have
overshadowed other problem-solving and community-oriented strategies.
Nevertheless, zero-tolerance, order maintenance, and heavy street-level
enforcement policing continue to be popular. The broken
windows theory has influenced community prosecution and community
court approaches that emphasize attacking nuisance or quality-of-life crimes.
The question remains, whether dispersing, arresting, and punishing homeless,
drunk, poor, mentally ill, or loitering people is the right response to the
social conditions of poverty, substance abuse, homelessness, and general apathy
that are related to crime and deterioration of American inner-city
neighborhoods.
From Leena Kurki,
Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 2000
27 Crime & Just. 235
Compelling
evidence for the effectiveness of policing in reducing crime comes from two
cases: New York and Ray Mallon in Hartlepool
and Middlesbrough. Both cases are associated
with what is called ‘zero tolerance’ policing. That term is unavoidable
but unsatisfactory - as one of its chief practitioners, Bill Bratton, has
observed. ‘Zero tolerance’ is intolerant only of the intolerable, not of
the wishes and rights of law-abiding citizens.
In
1982, the American academics James Q. Wilson and George Kelling
advanced their "Broken Windows" theory of policing. It has
become known as "zero tolerance" policing in that it advocates
intolerance of all types of crime rather than only the most serious.
Their
thesis was that the police had concentrated on crime but forgotten about
order. They had ceased regular foot patrols, ignored community policing
and systematically failed to act against minor criminal or sub-criminal
activities - like begging, prostitution, vandalism, drug-taking and drunken
rowdiness - which degraded neighbourhoods. As a
consequence more serious criminals had been able to take over the streets and
open spaces of cities.
Part
of their argument was that bad behaviour that went
unchecked would lead to the breakdown of the order naturally enforced by
communities: "A stable neighbourhood of families
who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on
unwanted intruders can change, in ...even a few months, to an inhospitable and
frightening jungle."
The
alternative strategy is for the police to take responsibility for responding
decisively to criminal conduct and sub-criminal neighbourhood
disorder. The aim is to take back from criminals and perpetrators of
petty offences the control of public spaces and return it to people who are
respectful of the rights of others. Public spaces will return to being
socially peacable and salubrious environments.
REDUCING INEQUITY
Police
reform based on "broken windows" and zero tolerance is about
introducing practices which lead to falls in crime across the board - all
offences, in all areas of town. An effective crime-redution
strategy should bring benefits for everyone.
Areas
where incomes are high suffer from lower crime rates on average.
Conversely, the poorest areas suffer the highest crime rates.
The
correlation between the poorest boroughs in London and their high rates of
crime shows that because people living in deprived areas are more likely to be
victims of crime, they are also the greatest beneficiaries of reforms which
reduce crime levels. In New York in the decade after the introduction of
zero tolerance policing, crime fell in the notoriously violent and deprived
borough of the Bronx by over two-thirds. Order was restored to the City
as a whole, not just the areas tourists visited.
-
Andrew Stuttaford, National Review, 3 August 2005