THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: CORE PRINCIPLES

(1) Basic Principles

A.  State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

B.  Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

(2) Foundations

The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in:

A.  obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty;

B.  the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;

C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law;

D. the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.

(3) Elements

The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities:

A.  The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

B.  The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

(4) Priorities

A.  Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.

B.  The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention

(1) The Just Cause Threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

A.  large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

B.  large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

(2) The Precautionary Principles

A.  Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

B.  Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

(3) Right Authority

A.  There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.

B.  Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.

C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.

D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

E.  If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:

                                                                                                            I.         consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure; and

                                                                                                          II.         action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.

F.  The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation - and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.

(4) Operational Principles

  1. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
  2. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
  3. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
  4. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
  5. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.
  6. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.

 

1. THE POLICY CHALLENGE

THE INTERVENTION DILEMMA

1.1   "Humanitarian intervention" has been controversial both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen. Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full horror of inaction. The United Nations (UN) Secretariat and some permanent members of the Security Council knew that officials connected to the then government were planning genocide; UN forces were present, though not in sufficient number at the outset; and credible strategies were available to prevent, or at least greatly mitigate, the slaughter which followed. But the Security Council refused to take the necessary action. That was a failure of international will - of civic courage - at the highest leveel. Its consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and continues to do so. In the aftermath, many African peoples concluded that, for all the rhetoric about the universality of human rights, some human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international community than others.

1.2   Kosovo - where intervention did take place in 1999 - concentrated attention on all the other sides of the argument. The operation raised major questions about the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state. Was the cause just: were the human rights abuses committed or threatened by the Belgrade authorities sufficiently serious to warrant outside involvement? Did those seeking secession manipulate external intervention to advance their political purposes? Were all peaceful means of resolving the conflict fully explored? Did the intervention receive appropriate authority? How could the bypassing and marginalization of the UN system, by "a coalition of the willing" acting without Security Council approval, possibly be justified? Did the way in which the intervention was carried out in fact worsen the very human rights situation it was trying to rectify? Or - against all this - was it the case that had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not intervened, Kosovo would have been at best the site of an ongoing, bloody and destabilizing civil war, and at worst the occasion for genocidal slaughter like that which occurred in Bosnia four years earlier?

1.3   The Bosnian case - in particular the failure by the United Nations and others to prevent the massacre of thousands of civilians seeking shelter in UN "safe areas" in Srebrenica in 1995 - is another which has had a major impact on the contemporary policy debate about intervention for human protection purposes. It raises the principle that intervention amounts to a promise to people in need: a promise cruelly betrayed. Yet another was the failure and ultimate withdrawal of the UN peace operations in Somalia in 1992-93, when an international intervention to save lives and restore order was destroyed by flawed planning, poor execution, and an excessive dependence on military force.

1.4   These four cases occurred at a time when there were heightened expectations for effective collective action following the end of the Cold War. All four of them - Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia - have had a profound effect on how the problem of intervention is viewed, analyzed and characterized.

1.5   The basic lines in the contemporary policy debate, one constantly being re-engaged at UN headquarters in New York and in capitals around the world, have been clearly enough drawn. For some, the international community is not intervening enough; for others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real issue is in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald a new world in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights. The controversy has laid bare basic divisions within the international community. In the interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions be resolved.

1.6   In an address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected upon "the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century." He recalled the failures of the Security Council to act in Rwanda and Kosovo, and challenged the member states of the UN to "find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity." The Secretary-General warned that "If the collective conscience of humanity cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice." In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly a year later, he restated the dilemma, and repeated the challenge:

if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?

1.7   In September 2000, the Government of Canada responded to the Secretary-General's challenge by announcing the establishment of this independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Our mandate was generally to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty; more specifically, it was to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics - and often paralysis - towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations. The membership of the Commission was intended to fairly reflect developed and developing country perspectives, and to ensure that we represented between us a wide range of geographical backgrounds, viewpoints, and experiences - with opinions, at least at the outset, reflecting the main lines of the current international debate. If we could produce consensus among ourselves, there was at least a chance that we might be able to encourage it in the wider international community.

1.8   The Commission met for the first time on 5-6 November 2000, in Ottawa. A year-long strategy for carrying out our mandate was there mapped out, with agreement that our work process should be transparent, inclusive, and global. The Government of Canada supported the establishment of a research directorate, and with assistance from a number of other governments and major foundations, sponsored and organized a series of regional roundtables and national consultations intended to expose the Commission to a wide and diverse range of views, while at the same time helping to inform public opinion about our work and objectives. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to ensure that views of affected populations were heard and taken into account, in addition to the views of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society representatives.

1.9   The Commission was strongly committed from the outset to consulting as widely as possible around the world, including in the countries of all five permanent members of the Security Council. Over the course of a year, accordingly, roundtable meetings or consultations were conducted in Beijing, Cairo, Geneva, London, Maputo, New Delhi, New York, Ottawa, Paris, St Petersburg, Santiago and Washington. The discussions at those meetings were invariably rich and rewarding; they are summarized in the supplementary volume accompanying this report. In addition, individual Commissioners and members of the research team attended a large number of conferences and seminars - often by special invitation or in a representative capacity. The Commission has also made a particular effort to consult a broad range of academic thinking and expertise; much of this analysis and advice is embodied in the research papers and bibliography contained in the supplementary volume.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1.10   The issues and preoccupations of the 21st century present new and often fundamentally different types of challenges from those that faced the world in 1945, when the United Nations was founded. As new realities and challenges have emerged, so too have new expectations for action and new standards of conduct in national and international affairs. Since, for example, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, it has become evident that the war against terrorism the world must now fight - one with no contested frontiers and a largely invisible enemy - is one like no other war before it.

1.11   Many new international institutions have been created to meet these changed circumstances. In key respects, however, the mandates and capacity of international institutions have not kept pace with international needs or modern expectations. Above all, the issue of international intervention for human protection purposes is a clear and compelling example of concerted action urgently being needed to bring international norms and institutions in line with international needs and expectations.

1.12   The current debate on intervention for human protection purposes is itself both a product and a reflection of how much has changed since the UN was established. The current debate takes place in the context of a broadly expanded range of state, non-state, and institutional actors, and increasingly evident interaction and interdependence among them. It is a debate that reflects new sets of issues and new types of concerns. It is a debate that is being conducted within the framework of new standards of conduct for states and individuals, and in a context of greatly increased expectations for action. And it is a debate that takes place within an institutional framework that since the end of the Cold War has held out the prospect of effective joint international action to address issues of peace, security, human rights and sustainable development on a global scale.